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The greater ubiquity of robots creates a need for generic guidelines for robot behavior. We 
focus less on how a robot can technically achieve a predefined goal and more on what 
a robot should do in the first place. Particularly, we are interested in the question how a 
heuristic should look like, which motivates the robot’s behavior in interaction with human 
agents. We make a concrete, operational proposal as to how the information-theoretic 
concept of empowerment can be used as a generic heuristic to quantify concepts, 
such as self-preservation, protection of the human partner, and responding to human 
actions. While elsewhere we studied involved single-agent scenarios in detail, here, we 
present proof-of-principle scenarios demonstrating how empowerment interpreted in 
light of these perspectives allows one to specify core concepts with a similar aim as 
Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics in an operational way. Importantly, this route does not 
depend on having to establish an explicit verbalized understanding of human language 
and conventions in the robots. Also, it incorporates the ability to take into account a rich 
variety of different situations and types of robotic embodiment.
Keywords: empowerment, information-theory, robot, intrinsic motivation, human robot interaction, value function, 
three laws of robotics
1. introdUCtion
One of the trends of modern robotics is to extend the role of robots beyond being a specifically 
designed machine with a clearly defined functionality that operates according to a confined speci-
fication or safely separated from humans. Instead, robots increasingly share living and work spaces 
with humans and act as servants, companions, and co-workers. In the future, these robots will have 
to deal with increasingly complex and novel situations. Thus, their operation will require to be guided 
by some form of generic, higher instruction level to be able to deal with previously unknown and 
unplanned-for situations in an effective way.
Once robotic control has to cope with more than replaying meticulously pre-arranged action 
sequences, or the execution of a predefined set of tasks as a reaction to a specified situation, the 
need arises for generic yet formalized guidelines which the robot can use to generate actions and 
preferences based on the current situation and the robot’s concrete embodiment.
We propose that any such guidelines should address the following three issues. First, “robot 
initiative”: we expect the principles to be generic enough for the robot to be able to apply them to 
novel situations. In particular, the robot should not only be able to respond according to predefined 
situations but also be able to generate new goals and directives as needed in new situations. Second, 
breaking action equivalence: how should a robot choose between several different actions when all 
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produce essentially the same desired outcome, only in different 
ways? Can we formulate good secondary criteria that the robot 
should optimize in addition, once it can ensure that the primary 
job gets done? Finally, safety around robots: the default approach 
often involves a “kill switch,” i.e., the drastic and crude step of 
shutting down the robot and stopping all its actuators. This 
rudimentary response is often undesirable, e.g., when the robot 
is carrying out a vital function where an immediate shutdown 
would lead to harm a human or itself, or when, to maintain safety 
and prevent damage, the robot is required to act rather than to 
stop acting. In summary, we propose that there is a pronounced 
need for generic, situation-aware guidelines that can inform and 
generate robot behavior.
Science Fiction literature, an often productive vehicle to 
explore ideas about the future, has come across this problem 
in its countless speculations about the role of robots in society. 
Arguably, the best-known suggestion for generic rules for robot 
behavior are Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov, 1942):
 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to harm.
 2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, 
except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protec-
tion does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
While there is ample room to discuss the technicalities and 
implications of the Three Laws (McCauley, 2007; Anderson, 2008; 
Murphy and Woods, 2009), we believe most people would agree 
with the general sentiment of the rules; Asimov himself argued 
that these rules are not particularly novel, but govern the design 
of any kind of tool humanity produces (Asimov, 1981). Asimov 
stated that he aimed to capture basic requirements of tools, 
namely, safety, compliance, and robustness, and his Three Laws 
are an attempt to explicitly express these properties in language. 
But one central problem in adapting these rules to current-day 
robots is the scant semantic comprehension of rules expressed in 
natural language.
In part, this is based on fundamental AI problems, such as deter-
mining the scope and context pertinent to such rules by robots 
or AIs in general (Dennett, 1984). Another AI-philosophical 
problem raises the question on how to assign meaning to the 
semantic concepts (Coradeschi et al., 2013). Since robots usually 
have a radically different perspective to humans, and hence a dif-
ferent perceptual reality, it remains doubtful if robots and human 
could have a common language. Already simple, and common 
concepts, such as “harm,” cannot be naively related to the robot’s 
perspective. Subsequently, it is difficult to build robots that 
understand what constitutes harm and thus can avoid inflicting it.
Even if we were to somehow imbue a robot with a human-level 
understanding of human language, we would still face the more 
pragmatic problem that human language carries intrinsic ambi-
guity. One example of this is the legal domain, where humans will 
argue what exactly constitutes “harm” in legal cases, demonstrat-
ing that there is no unambiguous understanding of this term that 
could just be applied in a technical fashion. Relatively simple 
sentences, such as the amendments of the US constitution have 
spawned decades of interpretation. Also, several of Asimov’s sto-
ries illustrate how robots find loopholes in their interpretations 
of the Three Laws that defy human expectations. Because of all 
previously mentioned problems, current-day robots are unable 
to generate actions or behavior complying with natural language 
directives, such as “protect human life” or “do no harm.” Even 
greater demand in regard to natural language processing is posed 
by the Second Law which requires the robot to be able to interpret 
any order. This requires a robust, unambiguous understanding of 
human language that cannot even be realized by humans.
In this paper, we have a similar aim as Asimov had with his 
Three Laws; however, rather than exactly reproduce the Laws, 
we propose a formal, non language-based method to capture the 
underlying properties of robots as tools. Instead of employing 
language, we suggest to use the information-theoretic measure of 
empowerment (Klyubin et al., 2008) in particular, and potential 
causal information flow (Ay and Polani, 2008) in general, as a 
heuristics to produce characteristic behavioral phenomenologies 
which can be interpreted as corresponding to the Three Laws in 
certain, crucial aspects. Note that we do not expect to reproduce 
the precise behavior associated with the Three Laws, but rather 
to capture essential intuitions we have about how the Three 
Laws should operate; those which cause us to agree with them 
in the first place. Importantly, we do not argue that the proposed 
heuristics give a complete and sufficient account for ethical robot 
behavior. Rather, at this stage, we consider properties such as 
safety, compliance, and robustness as secondary to the main robot 
mission. This is very much in line with the idea of robots as serv-
ants and companions put forward in the “principles of robotics” 
(Boden et al., 2011). In contrast, principles such as Tilden’s Laws 
of Robotics that focus solely on the robot as autonomous, self-
preserving life forms—basically living machines (Hasslacher 
and Tilden, 1995)—are expressly not in the scope of this article. 
Nevertheless, we like to point out existing work that links 
empowerment to the idea of autonomous and living systems 
(Guckelsberger and Salge, 2016).
Centrally, we propose here that the empowerment formalism 
offers an operational and quantifiable route to technically realize 
some of the ideas behind the Three Laws in a generic fashion. To 
this end, we will first introduce the idea behind empowerment. 
We will then proceed to give both a formal definition and the 
different empowerment perspectives. We will then discuss how 
these different perspectives correspond to concepts, such as 
self-preservation, compliance, and safety. Finally, we will discuss 
extensions, challenges, and future work needed to fully realize 
this approach on actual robots.
2. eMpoWerMent
Empowerment is an information-theoretic quantity that captures 
how much an agent is in control of the world it can perceive. 
It is formalized by the information-theoretic channel capacity 
between the agent’s actuations during a given time interval and 
the effects on its sensory perception at a time following this 
interval. Empowerment was introduced by Klyubin et al. (2005) 
to provide agents with a generic, a prioristic intrinsic motivation 
that might act as a stepping stone toward more complex behavior. 
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An information-theoretic measure, it quantifies how much poten-
tial causal influence an agent has on the world it can perceive. 
Empowerment was motivated by the idea to unify several seem-
ingly disparate drives of organisms of multiple levels of com-
plexity, such as maintaining a good internal sugar level, staying 
healthy, becoming a leader in a gang, accumulating money, etc. 
(Klyubin et al., 2008). While all these drives enhance survivability 
in one way or another, one unifying theme that ties them together 
is maintaining and enhancing one’s ability to act and control the 
environment. Empowerment attempts to capture this notion in 
an operational formalism; in this paper, we specifically want to 
demonstrate how this principle can serve as a cognitive heuristic 
to generate behavior in the spirit of the Three Laws of Robotics. 
For this, we consider empowerment from different, but related 
perspectives.
To motivate empowerment and gain a better understanding, 
let us first take a brief look at the background, before moving on to 
the formal definition. Oesterreich (1979) argues that agents should 
act so that their actions lead to perceivably different outcomes, 
which he calls “efficiency divergence” (“Effizienzdivergenz” in 
German). In the ideal case, different actions should lead to dif-
ferent perceivable outcomes. Von Foerster (2003) famously stated 
“I shall act always so as to increase the total number of choices,” 
arguing that a state where many options are open to an agent 
is preferable. Furthermore, Seligman (1975) argues that humans 
who are forced to be in a state where one’s actions appear to have 
random outcomes or no outcome variation at all suffer mental 
health problems. This relates to more recent empirical studies 
by Trendafilov and Murray-Smith (2013), which indicated that 
humans in a control task associate a low level of empowerment 
with frustration and perform better in situations where they are 
highly empowered. More recently, ideas similar to empowerment 
have also emerged in physics (Wissner-Gross and Freer, 2013), 
proposing a closely related action principle; the latter is, how-
ever, motivated by the hypothesized thermodynamic Maximum 
Entropy Production Principle instead of being based on evolu-
tionary and psychological arguments.
2.1. empowerment as intrinsic Motivation
In essence, empowerment formalizes a “motivation for effectance, 
personal causation, competence, and self-determination,” which 
is considered to be one area of intrinsic motivation by Oudeyer 
and Kaplan (2007), Oudeyer et al. (2007). Intrinsic motivation is 
a term introduced by Ryan and Deci (2000) as: “[…] the doing 
of an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than for some 
separable consequence.” In the last decades, a number of methods 
have been suggested to artificially generate behaviors of a similar 
nature as has been hypothesized about intrinsically motivated 
organisms. Among these are Artificial Curiosity (Schmidhuber, 
1991), Learning Progress (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007), Predictive 
Information (Ay et al., 2008), Homeokinesis (Der et al., 1999), or 
the Autotelic Principle (Steels, 2004). Not all of them are related 
to personal causation, most are more focused on the “reduction 
of cognitive dissonance” and on “optimal incongruity.” But all 
of them are to some extent intrinsic to the idea of agency itself, 
and they all share a set of properties that makes them well suited 
to imbue agents and robots with generic, motivated behavior 
without reliance on an externally defined reward structure. They 
usually are
• task-independent,
• computable from the agent’s perspective,
• directly applicable to many different sensorimotor configura-
tions, without or with little external tuning, and
• sensitive to and reflective of different agent embodiments.
The task-independence demarcates this approach from most 
classical AI techniques, such as reinforcement learning (Sutton 
and Barto, 1998); the general idea is not to solve any particular 
task well, or to be able to learn how to do a specific task well, 
but instead to offer an incentive for behavior even if there is cur-
rently no specific task the agent needs to attend to. In the case of 
empowerment, the behavior generated turns out to coincide well 
with the idea of robot self-preservation.
The computability from an agent’s perspective is an essential 
requirement. If some form of intrinsic motivation is to be realized 
by an organism or deployed onto an autonomous robot, then the 
organism/robot needs to be able to evaluate this measure from its 
own perspective, i.e., based on its own sensor input. This relies on 
a notion of Umwelt by von Uexküll (1909), because any intrinsic 
preference relation will be defined with respect to the agent’s 
experience, i.e., its perceived dynamics between the agent’s sen-
sors and actuators; the latter, in turn, arises from the interplay of 
the environment and the embodied agent. This is closely related 
to the concept of a “counterworld” (Gegenwelt (von Uexküll, 
1909)), the internal mirroring of the Umwelt, but one that only 
captures functional circles, those relations where actions relate 
to relevant feedback from the environment. Empowerment fits 
with this approach, as it does not require an explicit, full world 
model that tries to capture the whole environment, but only a 
short-term forward model that relates its current actions and 
context (typically a sensor-based belief about the current state) 
to the subsequent sensor states which are expected to result 
from these actions. Ziemke and Sharkey (2001) provide a more 
in-depth explanation of the Umwelt concept and also provide an 
overview of modern robotic approaches, such as the Subsumption 
Architecture by Brooks (1986) that realizes robot control as a 
hierarchy of functional circles. Empowerment, and to a large 
extent also the other mentioned intrinsic motivation measures, 
are usually compatible with these bottom-up approaches with 
minimal models focused on immediate action–perception loops.
The next property of intrinsic motivation is the ability to 
cope with different, quite disparate sensorimotor configurations. 
This is highly desirable for the definition of general behavioral 
guidelines for robots. This means not having to define them 
separately for every robot or change them manually every time 
the robot’s morphology changes. The applicability to different 
sensorimotor configurations combined with the requirement 
of task-independence is the central requirements for such a 
principle to be universal. More precisely: to be universal, a driver 
for intrinsic motivation should ideally operate in essentially the 
same manner and arise from the same principles, regardless of 
the particular embodiment or particular situation. A measure of 
this kind can then identify “desirable” changes in both situation 
(e.g., in the context of behavior generation) and embodiment 
FiGUre 1 | The perception–action loop visualized as a Causal Bayesian network (Pearl, 2000). S is the sensor, A is the actuator, and R represents the rest of the 
system. The index t indicates the time at which the variable is considered. This model is a minimal model for a simple memoryless agent. The red arrows indicate the 
direction of the potential causal flow relevant for 3-step empowerment. If empowerment is measured, the input to each of the actions is freely chosen, disconnected 
from the sensor input, but inside the 3-step horizon the actions may expressly be correlated—see also discussion in Klyubin et al. (2008).
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(e.g., in the context of development or evolution). For example, 
while most empowerment work focusses on state evaluation and 
action generation, some work also considers its use for sensor or 
actuator evolution (Klyubin et al., 2008).
Furthermore, this implies that a measure for intrinsic motiva-
tion should not just remain generically computable, but also be 
sensitive to different morphologies. The challenge is to define a 
value function in such a way that it stays meaningful when the 
situation or the embodiment of the agent changes. An illustrative 
example here are studies where an agent had the ability to move 
and place blocks in a simulated world (Salge et al., 2014a). Driven 
by empowerment maximization, the agent changed the world in 
such a way that the resulting structures ended up reflecting the 
particular embodiment of the agent.
To sum up this section, if we want to use an intrinsic motiva-
tion measure as a surrogate for what Pfeifer and Bongard (2006) 
call a value function in the context of embodied robotics, then 
we propose it needs to fulfill these criteria. Here, we specifically 
concentrate on empowerment, since it has been shown to be a 
suitable candidate to produce the desired behavior; furthermore, 
many of its relevant properties have already been studied in 
some detail now (Salge et  al., 2014c). However, we would like 
to emphasize that the concepts to be developed below are not 
limited to empowerment in their application, but might also be 
adaptable to alternative intrinsic motivation methodologies in 
order to provide operational safety principles for robots.
2.2. empowerment Formalism
To make our subsequent studies precise, we now give a formal 
definition of empowerment. Empowerment is formalized as the 
maximal potential causal flow (Ay and Polani, 2008) from an 
agent’s actuators to an agent’s sensors at a later point in time. This 
can be formalized in the terms of information theory as channel 
capacity (Shannon, 1948).
To compute empowerment, we model the agent–world inter-
action as a perception–action loop as in Figure 1. In Figure 1, 
we are looking at a time-discrete model, where an agent interacts 
with the world. An agent chooses an action At for the next time 
step based on its sensor input St in the current time step t. This 
influences the state of Rt+1 (in the next time step), which in turn 
influences the sensor input St+1 of the agent at that time step. The 
cycle then repeats itself, with the agent choosing another action 
in At+1. Note that, in a more general model, this choice of action 
might also be influenced by some internal state of the agent which 
carries information about the agent’s past.
For the computation of empowerment, we consider 
this perception–action loop as telling us how actions may 
potentially influence a state in the future, and by influence 
we emphatically mean not the actual outcome of the concrete 
trajectory that the agent takes, but rather the potential future 
outcomes at the given time horizon t + 3, i.e., the distribution 
of outcomes that could be generated by actuation, starting 
from time t. The most straightforward interpretation is as a 
probabilistic communication channel where the agent trans-
mits information about actions At, At+1, At+2 through a channel 
and considers how much of it is reflected in the outcome in 
St+3. The maximal influence of an agent’s actions on its future 
sensor states (again, not its actual actions, but its potential 
actions) can now be modeled formally as Shannon channel 
capacity: what the agent may possibly (but need not) transmit 
over the channel—or, in fact, what the agent may (but need 
not) have changed in the environment, at the end of its 3-step 
action sequence.
Empowerment is then defined as the channel capacity 
between the agent’s actuators A in a sequence of time steps and 
its own sensors S at a later point in time. For example, if we look at 
empowerment in regard to just the next time step, then empow-
erment can be expressed as
 
E( ) ( ) max ( )
( )
r C A S r I S A rt t p a r t tt
:= → | ≡ ; | .+ | +1 1  
(1)
Note that the maximization implies that it is calculated under 
the assumption that the controller which chooses the action 
sequences (At)t is completely free to act from time t onward (but 
permitted to correlate the actions) and is not bound to a particular 
behavior strategy p(a|s, r).
Furthermore, empowerment is a state-dependent quantity, as 
it depends on the state r in which the consideration of potential 
futures is initiated. Instead of an externally observable objective 
state r, one could also consider empowerment based on a purely 
agent-intrinsic “context” states derived from earlier agent expe-
riences (Klyubin et  al., 2008) without conceptual changes. For 
simplicity and clarity, we will here discuss only empowerment 
landscapes depending on “objective” states r. We also assume for 
the beginning of the paper that the agent has somehow previously 
acquired a sufficiently accurate local forward model p(st+1|at, st). 
FiGUre 2 | The time-unrolled perception–action loop with two agents visualized as a Bayesian Network. S is the robot sensor, Sh the human sensor, A is the robot 
actuator, Ah is the human actuator, and R represents the rest of the system. The index t indicates the time at which the variable is considered. The arrows are causal 
connections of the Bayesian networks, the dotted and dashed line denote the three types of causal information flows relevant to the three types of empowerment 
discussed in the text. The red dotted arrows indicate the direction of the potential causal flow relevant for 3-step robot empowerment, the blue dotted arrows 
denotes human empowerment, and the dashed purple line indicates the human-to-robot transfer empowerment.
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We will later discuss the general difficulties and implications of 
the model acquisition itself.
Empowerment is defined for both discrete and continuous 
variables. However, while it is possible to directly determine the 
channel capacity for the discrete case using the Blahut–Arimoto 
Algorithm (Arimoto, 1972; Blahut, 1972) to compute a channel 
capacity achieving distribution p*(a|r), this algorithm cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to the continuous case. There exist adap-
tations for empowerment calculation in the continuum, though. 
Jung et  al. (2011) use Monte-Carlo Integration to approximate 
empowerment, but this method is very computationally expen-
sive. A significantly faster method approximates empowerment 
of a continuous channel by treating it as a linear channel with 
added independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian 
noise (Salge et al., 2012).
2.3. empowerment Maximization Behavior
When talking about an empowerment-maximizing agent, it must 
be emphasized that the distribution p*(a|r) achieving the channel 
capacity is not the one that an empowerment-maximizing agent 
actually uses to choose its next action. The capacity-achieving 
distribution is only utilized to compute the empowerment value 
of world states; for each such state, an empowerment value is thus 
computed, which defines a pseudo-utility landscape on the state 
space. For the actual action, the agent chooses a greedy strategy 
with respect to this pseudo-utility: it chooses its actions as to 
locally maximize the empowerment of the next state it will visit.
To illustrate, an agent might prefer a state where it would have 
the option to jump off a cliff. However, assuming that the agent 
would break from the fall or have to tortuously climb up again, the 
agent would not actually select the action that would cause it to 
fall off the cliff; it will just want to possess the option. Importantly, 
this requires the agent to have a correct forward model of what 
will happen when stepping off the cliff. If there is noise in the 
dynamics, this will, on the other hand, lead empowerment to pull 
the agent slightly away from the cliff, as the agent in this case 
cannot ensure that it would not accidentally fall off the cliff. This 
is similar to on-policy reinforcement learning.
In past work, two main strategies have been used. Greedy 
empowerment maximization basically considers all possible 
actions in the current state and then computes the successor 
states (or state distributions) for each of those actions. Then, 
empowerment is calculated for each of those successor states. The 
successor state with the highest empowerment is selected, and the 
agent then performs the action leading to the chosen successor 
state. In case each action has a distribution of successor states, 
then the action with the highest average successor state empower-
ment is selected. This has the advantage that the agent only needs 
to compute the empowerment for the immediate successor states 
in the future.
Alternatively, the agent could compute the empowerment 
values for each possible state of the world, or a subset thereof. The 
agent could then determine the state with the maximal empow-
erment and then plan a sequence of actions to get to this state 
(Leu et al., 2013). This solution is, of course, infeasible in general.
Here, however, we will, in accordance with the latter prin-
ciple, generally present the computed empowerment values as 
an empowerment map, because it gives an overview over what 
behavior would be preferred in either case. The map visualizes 
both the local gradients and the optima. The behaviors resulting 
from these maps would then be either an agent that acts in order 
to climb up the local gradient or to reach a global optimum.
3. eMpoWerMent perspeCtiVes
In this section, we outline how we can use the empowerment 
formalism to capture the essential aspects of the Three Laws. For 
this, we look at a system that contains both a human and a robotic 
agent. The Causal Bayesian Network from Figure  2 shows the 
combined perception–action loop of both a human and a robot. 
There is a jointly accessible world R that both the human and 
robotic agent can perceive and act upon with their respective 
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sensor and actuator variables. In such a system, it is possible to 
define different empowerment perspectives: here, we will look at 
robot empowerment, human empowerment, and human-to-robot 
transfer empowerment.
Robot empowerment is defined as the channel capacity with 
respect to the robot’s actuators A and sensor S. This is the clas-
sical empowerment perspective. The robot choosing actions to 
maximize robot empowerment leads to behavior that preserves 
and enhances the robots ability to act and affect is surroundings. 
The propose, therefore, that robot empowerment can provide a 
heuristic for self-preservation and reliability.
Human Empowerment is similarly defined as the channel 
capacity with respect to the human’s actuators Ah and sensors Sh. 
The difference here is that it is still the robot that chooses its own 
actions as to maximize the human’s empowerment. This should 
create robot behavior aimed at preserving and enhancing the 
human’s ability to act. This provides a heuristic that ultimately 
protects the human from environmental influences that would 
destroy the human or reduce its ability to act. It also creates 
behavior that aims to enhance the human’s access and influence 
on the world and keeps the robot from hindering or harming the 
human directly. This heuristic somewhat corresponds to the First 
Law and provides a degree of safety.
Human-to-robot transfer empowerment is defined as the channel 
capacity from the human’s actuators Ah to the robot’s sensors S. 
This captures the potential causal flow from the human’s actions 
to the world perceived by the robot. If the robot acts to maximize 
this value, it will maintain something we like to call operational 
proximity. It will keep the robot close to the human in a way where 
close does not necessarily mean physically close, but close so that 
the human can affect the robot. Furthermore, transfer empower-
ment can also be raised by the robot acting reliable, i.e., reacting 
in a predictable manner to the human’s actions. This enhances 
the humans ability to act and would allow for the human to use 
certain actions to direct the robot. We propose, therefore, that this 
heuristic captures certain aspects of reliability and compliance, 
without directly reproducing the Second Law of robotics.
In combination these three heuristics should provide an 
operationalized motivation for robots to act in a way that 
reflects the sentiment behind the Three Laws of Robotics. The 
core of this idea was initially suggested by Salge et al. (2014b). 
Guckelsberger et al. (2016) have later used similar perspectives 
(they used transfer empowerment in the opposite direction) to 
generate companion behavior for a non-player character (NPC) 
in a dungeon crawler game.
3.1. robot empowerment
Robot empowerment is the potential causal information flow from 
the robot’s actuators to the robot’s sensors at a later point in time. 
In this perspective, the human is simply included in the external 
part of the perception–action loop of the robot. From the robot’s 
perspective, all variables pertaining to the human are subsumed 
in R. The human’s influence on the transition probabilities from 
A to S become relevant to it only as part of the robot’s “Umwelt” 
and as such they are integrated into the robot’s local forward 
model. Therefore, we expect robot empowerment behavior to 
be similar to what is observe in existing work on single agent 
empowerment maximization (Klyubin et  al., 2005, 2008; Salge 
et  al., 2014c), where empowerment behavior aims to maintain 
the agent’s freedom of operation and, indirectly, its survivability.
Typical empowerment-driven behavior can be seen, e.g., in 
control problems, where empowerment maximization balances 
a pendulum and a double pendulum, and also stabilizes a bicycle 
(Jung et  al., 2011). We emphasize that in these examples no 
external reward needs to be specified, and empowerment derives 
directly from the intrinsic dynamics of the system. In other 
words, empowerment identifies the balancing positions as goals 
without an external specification of a goal, because these states 
offer the greatest degree of simultaneous control and predicta-
bility. Notably, empowerment has a tendency to drive the agent 
away from states where it would become inoperational, corre-
sponding to a breakdown or “death” of an organism. Importantly, 
this does not require an external penalty for death, as breakdown 
or death are directly represented in the formalism via the van-
ishing of empowerment. Typically, a negative empowerment 
gradient can serve as an alert to the agent that it is in danger 
of moving toward destructive (or loss-of-control) states (Salge 
et al., 2014a). Guckelsberger and Salge (2016) summarize a lot 
of the self-preservation aspects of empowerment and argue that 
empowerment maximization can lead to autopoesis (Maturana 
and Varela, 1991).
More concretely relevant for the present argument is the work 
by Leu et al. (2013), pictured in Figure 3, where a physical robot 
uses the 2D-map of its environment to create an empowerment 
map to modulate its navigation. While the robot realized its 
primary objective to follow a human, it also tried to maintain its 
own empowerment, thereby avoiding to get stuck or to navigate 
into a tight passage which would reduce its ability to act. In the 
experiment, the reaction of the environment to the robot’s actions 
is learnt using Gaussian process models. The human-following 
behavior itself is hard-coded and the human behavior itself is not 
covered by the model.
While the human-in-the-loop can be treated, from the robot’s 
perspective, as just another part of the environment, we can 
modify our question and ask how the maximization of robot 
empowerment will affect the human or what kind of interactive 
behavior will result from this? Consider Figure  4, depicting a 
simplified model of the set-up in Figure 3. The figures show that, 
once we simulate the human behavior as part of the model, the 
robot’s empowerment is drastically reduced around the human. 
First, in this particular scenario the robot’s safety shutdown turns 
it off in proximity to the human, and its empowerment drops to 
zero. So the human can perform (move) actions that will oblit-
erate the robot’s empowerment. Other setups will have a different 
and possibly less drastic response, but in any case the presence 
of the human impacts the robot’s empowerment. Notably, if the 
robot’s resulting sensor state can be influenced by the human’s 
actions, it is possible for the human to disturb the outcome of the 
robot’s behavior. Depending on how well the robot can predict 
the human’s action, the anticipated outcome, i.e., its sensor state 
at the time horizon, will be more or less noisy. Empowerment 
selectively avoids interactions with unpredictable agents (Salge 
et al., 2013) and generally noisy, unpredictable situations. It low-
ers the robot’s control over its own environment and thereby its 
FiGUre 4 | Robot empowerment (in grayscale: dark—low, bright—high) 
dependent on the robot position. Obstacles in blue. Two different human 
(yellow circle) behavior models are considered. If the robot would be within 
the safety shutdown distance (red circle), it is not able to act. The red dots 
are the endpoints of the 2,000 random human action trajectories used for 
possible action predictions, the two graphs differ in the assumed distribution 
of human movement in the next three steps. If one compares the 
empowerment close to the safety shutdown distance, one can see that the 
assumed human behavior influences the estimated empowerment while all 
other aspects of the simulation remain unchanged.
FiGUre 3 | Empowerment-driven robot follower as described in Leu et al. (2013). The robot tries to follow the human while trying to maintain its empowerment in 
the obstacled environment. By trying to maintain empowerment, the robot keeps away from obstacles and walls and, furthermore, avoids passing through the 
narrow passage separating it from the human because it would constrain its movement. The left subfigure shows the experimental setup, with a scaled 
empowerment map on the bottom left. The top left shows the robot’s view, used for tracking the human. The right subfigure shows the room layout with 
empowerment map overlaid; right: gradient vector field of the scaled empowerment map, scaled by Euclidean distance to the human to induce following behavior.
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sensor input; this loss of predictable control expresses itself in a 
loss of empowerment.
The effects of this can be seen in Figure 4, where the robot empow-
erment landscape is changed purely by a different human behavior 
model. On the right, we have a more accurate model of the pre-
dicted human behavior, which also assumes that the human moves 
toward the upper left. This moves the shutdown zone where the 
robot empowerment vanishes and at the same time also “sharpens” 
the contrast between the high- and low-empowered areas. The 
sharper contrast is a result of the reduced amount of noise being 
injected by the human into the robot’s perception–action loop.
A reliably predictable human would also allow the robot to 
maintain a higher empowerment closer to the human if it would 
stay south-west of the human, basically opposite of the humans 
predicted movement direction. In general, obtaining a better 
human model can increase the robot’s perceived model-based 
empowerment by reducing the human noise and by providing a 
better estimate which states in close proximity to the humans are 
less likely to become disempowering.
A related phenomenon was observed in a study by 
Guckelsberger et  al. (2016), where three different empower-
ment perspectives were used to control a NPC companion in 
a NetHack-like dungeon crawler game. In one simulation, the 
player was able to shoot an arrow which would kill the NPC. 
This caused the empowerment-driven NPC agent to always 
avoid standing in the direction of the player. The NPC’s world 
model assumed that all actions of the player were equally likely, 
and therefore, assumed that there is a chance that the player 
would kill the NPC. This led to a tendency to avoid the player. 
Guckelsberger et  al. showed that this could be mitigated by a 
“trust” assumption, basically changing the player model as to 
assume the player to be benevolent to the NPC and would not 
perform an action that would lead to a loss of all NPC empower-
ment (i.e., kill the NPC). This made the NPC less inclined to flee 
from the player. Applied to a real robot, this trust assumption 
would make sure that the robot would focus on mitigating actual 
possible threats rather than having to hedge against malevolent 
or even just negligent human action (“friendly fire”).
Better model acquisition is necessary for an agent to gage 
whether or not to avoid humans, depending on their cooperation, 
unpredictability, or antagonism. But empowerment maximiza-
tion offers, by itself, not a direct incentive toward or away from 
human interaction. It is possible to imagine that the human could 
perform actions that would increase or preserve the robots or 
NPCs empowerment, such as feeding or repairing/healing it. 
This would then likely create a drive toward the human, if this is 
modeled in viable timescales. In absence of any specific possible 
benefits provided by the human, however, the agent driven by 
empowerment alone is not automatically drawn toward interact-
ing with a human and is likely to drift away over time. This will 
be addressed in the other perspectives below.
In short, we propose to maximize robot empowerment to gen-
erate behavior by which the robot strives toward self-preservation. 
FiGUre 5 | Human empowerment (in grayscale: dark—low, bright—high) 
dependent on the robot’s position. In this simulation, a laser (indicated by the 
red line) blocks the human’s movement, but the laser can be occluded by the 
robot body. Thus, Human empowerment is the highest for robot positions 
toward the right wall where the robot blocks the laser and thereby allows the 
human a greater range of movement.
8
Salge and Polani Empowerment and the Three Laws
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org June 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 25
Specifically, becoming inoperational corresponds to vanishing 
empowerment. In turn, having high empowerment means that 
the robot has a high influence on the world it can perceive, 
implying a high readiness to respond to a variety of challenges 
that might emerge. We propose this principle, namely, maximiz-
ing empowerment, as a generic measure as a plausible proxy 
for producing behavior in the spirit of the Third Law, as it will 
cause the robot to strive away from states where it expects to be 
destroyed or inoperational, and to strive toward states where it 
achieves the maximum potential effect. Robot empowerment 
maximization thus acts to some extent as a surrogate for a drive 
toward self-preservation.
3.2. Human empowerment
We now turn to human empowerment. Human empowerment 
is defined in analogy to robot empowerment as the potential 
causal flow from the human’s actuators to the human’s sen-
sors. The robot is now part of the external component of the 
perception–action loop of the human. Maximizing, or at least 
preserving human empowerment has similar effects to the 
previous case: keeping it at a high value implies maintaining the 
human’s influence on the world and avoiding situations which 
would hinder or disable the human agent. A central difference 
to the previous case is that the human empowerment is made 
dependent on the robot; in other words, now the robot aims 
to maximize the empowerment of another agent rather than 
its own.
Figure  5 shows another continuous 2D scenario, this time 
involving a laser. The laser would block the human’s movement, 
but is harmless to the robot and can be blocked by it. The grayscale 
coloring this time indicates the value of the human empowerment, 
but still depending on the robot’s position. Notably, the highest 
empowerment is achieved when the robot is in the white area. 
This is where the robot blocks the laser coming from the right 
side, permitting the human to move past the laser barrier. Driven 
by maximization of human empowerment, the robot would, 
therefore, prefer to move in front of the laser. Importantly, note 
that high human empowerment values for the robot in this area 
only become pronounced when the human is close to the laser 
barrier (as is the case in the figure, the human position denoted by 
the yellow circle). This means that the drive to block the laser only 
emerges at all when the human is actually in a position to pass it.
We can also see in Figure 5 that positions in the area directly 
around the human produce low human empowerment. This is 
because the robot would partially block the humans movement 
if it were in these positions close to the human. Also note that 
the empowerment landscape for the robot being further away 
from the human is flat. Here, the robot is so far away that it does 
not interact in any way with the human’s action–perception loop, 
and therefore, its exact position has no influence on the human’s 
empowerment.
For another illustrative example of the effect of considering 
human empowerment-driven robots, consider the NPC (non-
person character; autonomous, computer-controlled player 
in a video games) in the dungeon crawler game scenario from 
Guckelsberger and Salge (2016). Here, the NPC avoids stand-
ing directly next to the (human) player, as this would block the 
player’s movement. If enemies are present that are predicted to 
shoot and kill the player, the NPC strives to kill these enemies to 
save the player. This can be combined with a maximization of the 
NPC’s own empowerment. Figure 6 shows a sequence of NPC 
actions that arise from combining the different heuristics. Here, 
the heuristics is a linear combination of the different empower-
ment types. As a result, the NPC will first save itself (as the human 
player has more health) and then it removes the two enemies. This 
complex behavior emerges from a greedy maximization of the 
linear combination of the different empowerment perspectives.
In this section, we considered human empowerment maximi-
zation (in the variant of being influenced by the artificial agent 
rather than the human). Using this variant as driver leads to 
a number of desirable behaviors. It prevents the robot from 
obstructing the human, for example, by getting too close or by 
interfering with the human’s actions. Both would be noticeable 
in the human empowerment value, because they would either 
constrain accessibility to states around the human, or inject noise 
in the human’s perception–action loop. In addition to that, the 
robot acts as to enhance or maintain the human’s empowerment, 
through “proactive”-appearing activities, represented in above 
examples by removing a barrier from the environment or by neu-
tralizing a threat that would destroy or maim the human or even 
just impede their freedom of movement. In this sense, human 
empowerment maximization can be plausibly interpreted as a 
driver for the agent toward protecting the human and supporting 
their agenda.
A number of caveats remain: to compute the human empow-
erment value, the robot not only needs a sufficient forward 
model but also needs to be able to identify the human agent in 
the environment, their possible actions, and how the human 
FiGUre 6 | Companion (C) and player (P), both purple, are threatened simultaneously by two enemies (E), both red. The images represent the successive moves: 
the companion escapes its own death, rescues the player, and finally defends itself. Left: combined heuristics for 2-step empowerment (see text), lighter colors 
indicating higher empowerment. Arrows indicate shooting. Figure taken from Guckelsberger and Salge (2016), reproduced with permission.
FiGUre 7 | A visualization of the human-to-robot (HtR) transfer 
empowerment dependent on robot position (dark—low, light—high). This 
simulation shows a slightly elevated human-to-robot transfer empowerment 
around the human agent (yellow) at the shutdown distance (red circle). This is 
because the human can move toward or away from the robot, thereby having 
the potential to stop the robot. This creates a potential causal flow from the 
human’s actions to the robot’s sensors, which in this case measure the robot 
position. Here, the physical proximity of the human allows it to directly 
influence the robot’s state.
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perceives the world via their sensors and what they are able to 
do with their actuators. This is not a trivial problem; however, 
it nevertheless has the advantage that it offers, in some ways, a 
“portable” and operational modeling route. While it depends on 
a sufficiently reliable algorithm for detecting humans and plau-
sible, if strongly abstracted, models for human perception and 
actuation, once these are provided, the principle is applicable to 
a wide range of scenarios. The present proposal suggest possible 
routes toward an operational implementation of a “do not cause 
harm to a human” and a “do not permit harm to be caused to a 
human” principle, provided one can endow the artificial agent 
with a—what could loosely be termed—“proto-empathetic” per-
spective of the human’s situation.
Another critical limitation to the applicability of the formal-
ism is the time horizon, which is the central free parameter in 
the empowerment computation. While a robot driven by human 
empowerment maximization might stop a bullet, or a fall into a 
pit, it would need to extend its time horizon massively to account 
for things that would be undesirable for the human in the short-
term, but are advantageous in the long run. To illustrate, consider 
the analogy from human lawmaking, where freedom to act on 
the short scale is curtailed in an effort to limit long-term damage 
(e.g., in environmental policies). The principle as discussed in 
this section is, therefore, best suited for interactions that have to 
avoid obstruction or interference by a robot in the short term and 
with immediate consequences. That being said, nothing in the 
formalism prevents one—in principle—to be able to account for 
long-term effects. To do so in practice will require extending the 
methods to deal with longer time-scales and levels of hierarchies.
3.3. transfer empowerment
As the third and last variant, we consider transfer empowerment. 
Transfer empowerment is defined as the potential causal informa-
tion flow from the actions of one agent to the sensors of another. 
One of the motivations for its development was to counter the 
lack of the two previous perspectives to provide an incentive that 
keeps the robot/companion from drifting away from the human. 
The aim was to add an incentive for the robot to remain at the 
human’s service. This is achieved by requiring that the human’s 
actions can influence the sensory input of the robot.
Figure 7 shows the human-to-robot (HtR) transfer empower-
ment, i.e., we consider the human movement as the empowerment- 
inducing action set and the empowerment-relevant sensor 
input is given by the robot positions. Here, we employ the safety 
shutdown mechanism at the fixed distance as a simple illustra-
tive proxy for other, potentially more complex influences that 
the human may have on the robot. In our case, the shutdown 
mechanism allows the human to selectively disable the robot, by 
moving toward or away from it. This creates a direct causal influ-
ence from the human to the robot. Consequently, this generates 
a ring of higher HtR transfer empowerment around the human. 
In general, any form of influence of the human on the percep-
tion of the robot will produce a modulation of the HtR transfer 
empowerment landscape. By maximizing this value, the robot 
would try to remain in a domain where the human can affect it.
This effect can alternatively be obtained by the analogous 
robot-to-human transfer empowerment; this was demonstrated 
in Guckelsberger and Salge (2016), see Figure 8. Here, the com-
panion tries to maximize the causal influence its actions have on 
FiGUre 9 | The time-unrolled perception–action loop of two agents, colored to visualize the different pathways potential causal flow can be realized. The red 
dashed line indicate the causal flow from the human actuator At
h at time t to the robot’s sensor variable St+3 at time t + 3, which contributes to human-to-robot 
transfer empowerment. This potential causal flow can be realized by direct human influence on the environment R (one exemplary path shown in blue). Alternatively, 
the human can influence the environment R, and the robot can then perceive this change, react to it by choosing an appropriate action A and thereby influence its 
perceived environment itself. One exemplary path is shown in orange. The dashed arrows are those used by both pathways.
A B C
FiGUre 8 | Two room scenario from Guckelsberger and Salge (2016), reproduced with permission. (a) Companion empowerment, n = 2. (B) Companion-player 
transfer empowerment, n = 2. (C) Coupled empowerment with movement trace, n = 2. In the last subfigure (C), the companion agent C is driven by a combination 
of its own empowerment and transfer empowerment from companion to player (values shown in grayscale, bright—high, dark—low). If only companion 
empowerment is driving the agent, as in subfigure (a), then the companion does not enter the corridor, as its narrowness will lower the agent’s own empowerment. 
With the addition of transfer empowerment, however, the companion begins to maintain operational proximity, and thus follows the player also through the narrow 
corridor. This can be seen in the movement trace of both player and agent.
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the human player’s input state, which also causes it to remain close 
to the player. This particular variant of empowerment helped to 
overcome the persistent problem that the companion would not 
follow the player through narrow corridors, as they were strongly 
constraining its empowerment.
So, in regard to creating player-following behavior, both direc-
tions of transfer empowerment seem to be suitable. But, looking 
at the causal Bayesian network representation in Figure 9, we can 
see that there are in principle two different ways how the human’s 
action can affect the robot’s sensors (and vice  versa). One way 
is for the human’s actions to directly change the world R in a 
way that will be perceived by the robot. The other way is for the 
human to also affect the world R, but then for the robot to detect 
this change via its own sensors, and react based on this input, 
changing parts of R itself. In the second case, the information 
flows through the internal part of the perception–action loop of 
the robot—in the first case it does not. An example of the second 
case can be seen in Figure 10, where the robot moves in the same 
direction as the human, if there is a direct line of sight between the 
two agents. This results in a high transfer empowerment in those 
areas where the human can be seen by the robot. Obtaining this 
high transfer empowerment requires the robot to react reliably to 
certain human actions.
The distinction between the two pathways for transfer 
empowerment, directly through the environment and through 
the internal part of the other agent’s perception–action loop, 
also provides us with reasons to prefer human-to-robot transfer 
empowerment over transfer empowerment in the other direction. 
In human-to-robot transfer empowerment, the internal pathway 
is through the agent; so the robot can consider adjusting its 
behavior, i.e., the way it responds with actions to sensor inputs, 
in order to increase the transfer empowerment. In the robot-to-
human transfer empowerment, the internal pathway is through 
the human, which the robot cannot optimize and the human 
should ideally not be burdened with optimizing. So, if one seeks 
to elicit a reliable reaction of the robot to the human’s action, then 
human-to-robot transfer empowerment should be the quantity 
to optimize.
Another difference between the two directions of transfer 
empowerment becomes evident when we compare Figures  4  
and 7. Both show the same simulation, but depict HtR- and robot 
empowerment, respectively. The area with higher HtR transfer 
FiGUre 10 | A visualization of the human-to-robot (HtR) transfer 
empowerment dependent on robot position (dark—low, light—high). In this 
scenario, the robot will mirror the human’s movement if it has a direct line of 
sight. This creates a high amount of potential causal flow through the robot 
where the latter sees the human. It results in comparatively high transfer 
empowerment in those areas where the robot has both a direct line of sight 
to the human (yellow) and is not shut down by close proximity to the human. 
The highest transfer empowerment is attained at a distance, but in an area 
where the robot can see and react to the human; with this, the robot 
provides the human with operational proximity, i.e., the ability to influence  
the robot’s resulting state.
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empowerment is exactly the same area where the robot empower-
ment around the human begins to drop. This is because while 
the human here gains control over the robot’s position, the latter 
loses this very control. Controllability of a specific shared variable 
in the environment is a limited resource, and if one agent has 
full control of it, the other agent consequently has none. This is 
another reason why the use of transfer empowerment is usually 
preferable in the human-to-robot direction, namely, as to not 
provide an incentive for the robot to take control away from the 
human.
The different scenarios we looked at also illustrate the idea of 
“operational proximity” that transfer empowerment captures. The 
influence of one agent on another does not necessarily depend on 
physical proximity, but rather on both agents’ embodiment, here 
in the form of their actions and sensor perceptions. While in one 
scenario the human could stop the robot by physical proximity, in 
the other they could direct the robot along their line of sight. In 
the dungeon example, the companion needs proximity to directly 
affect the player by blocking or shooting it, but one could also 
instead imagine a situation where the NPC would push a button 
far away or block a laser somewhere else to affect the environ-
ment of the player. Maximizing transfer empowerment tries to 
attain this operational rather than physical proximity. In turn, 
operational proximity acts as a necessary precondition for any 
interaction and coordination between the agents. To interact, one 
agent has to be able to perceive the changes of the world induced 
by the other agent. Vanishing transfer empowerment would mean 
that not even this basic level of interaction is possible.
Furthermore, HtR transfer empowerment maximization also 
creates an incentive to reliably react to the human actions. In 
detail, this means increasing the transfer empowerment further 
by allowing for some potential causal flow through the internal 
part of the robot’s perception–action loop. Note that for the 
empowerment calculation, it does not matter how precisely robot 
actions are matched to human actions; all that counts is that by 
consistently responding in the same way the robot effectively 
extends the human’s empowerment in the world. The robot 
reacting to the human expands the influence of the latter on the 
world, because the human’s actions are amplified by the robot’s 
actions. An additional effect is that, if a robot reliably reacts to 
the human’s actions, the human can learn this relationship and 
use its own actions as proto-gestures to control the robot. On 
the one hand, this is still far removed from giving explicit verbal 
orders to the robot, as described in the Second Law. On the other 
hand, such a reliable reaction of the robot to human actions 
would permit humans to “learn” a command language consisting 
of certain behaviors and gestures that would then cause the robot 
to respond in a desired way.
Summarizing the section, while the maximization of transfer 
empowerment does not precisely capture the Second Law, it 
creates operational proximity between the human and the robot, 
and thereby the basis for further interaction; together with the 
enhancement of human empowerment, it sets the foundation 
for the human to have the maximum amount of options avail-
able. Furthermore, if the robot behavior itself is included in the 
computation of transfer empowerment to be optimized, then 
this would provide an additional route to amplify the human’s 
actions in the world, namely by virtue of manipulating the robot 
via actions and proto-gestures which make use of an implicitly 
learnt understanding of the internal control of the robot.
4. disCUssion
The core aim of this article was to suggest three empowerment 
perspectives and to propose that these allow—in principle—for 
a formalization and operationalization of ideas roughly cor-
responding to the Three Laws of Robotics (not in order): the 
self-preservation of a robot, the protection of the robot’s human 
partner, and the robot supporting/expanding the human’s 
operational capabilities. Empowerment endows a state space 
cum transition dynamic with a generic pseudo-utility function 
that serves as a rich preference landscape without requiring an 
explicit, externally defined reward structure; on the other hand, 
where desired, it can be combined with explicit task-dependent 
rewards. Empowerment can be used as both a generic and 
intrinsic value function. It serves not only as a warning indicator 
that one is approaching the boundaries of the viability domain 
(i.e., being close to areas of imminent breakdown/destruction) 
but also imbues the interior of the viability domain with addi-
tional preference structure in advance of any task-specific utility. 
This, together with the properties outlined in Section 2.1 about 
intrinsic motivations, suggests empowerment as a useful driving 
principle for an embodied robot.
For the practical application of the presented formalism to 
real and more complex robot–human interaction scenarios, still 
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a number of issues, such as computability and model acquisition 
need to be addressed. The following discussion outlines sugges-
tions on how some of these challenges can be overcome and the 
problems still to be solved to deploy the presented heuristics on 
real-world scenarios.
4.1. Computability
Extending the idea presented here from simple abstract models 
into the domain of practical robotics immediately raises the ques-
tions of computability. In the classical empowerment formalism, 
computation time scales dramatically with an increase in sensor 
and actuator states and with an extension of the temporal horizon. 
In discrete domains, previous work has demonstrated a number 
of ways as to how to speed up the computation: one being the 
impoverished empowerment approach by Anthony et al. (2011). 
Here, one only considers the most “meaningful” action sequences 
to generate the empowerment, pruning away the others, and then 
building up longer action sequences by extending only those 
meaningful action sequences.
A simple alternative option is to just sample a subset of all 
action sequences and compute empowerment based on this 
sample to get a heuristic estimate for the actual value (Salge et al., 
2014a). This approach only works effectively in a system with 
discrete states and deterministic dynamics that does not spread 
out too much.
Earlier, we mentioned a fast approximation method for con-
tinuous variables (Salge et al., 2012). This assumes that the local 
transition can be sufficiently well approximated by a Gaussian 
channel. Another recent and fast approximation for Gaussian 
channels uses variance propagation methods, implemented using 
neural networks (Karl et al., 2015). Another promising approach 
utilizing neural networks is presented by Mohamed and Jimenez 
Rezende (2015) and provides not only considerable speed-ups 
but also has the advantage of working without an explicit forward 
model.
With the establishment of empowerment as a viable and use-
ful intrinsic motivation driver for artificial agents in a battery of 
proof-of-principle scenarios over the last years, it has become 
evident that it is well warranted to invest effort into improving 
and speeding up empowerment computation for realistically 
sized scenarios. The previous list of methods shows that a promis-
ing range of approaches to speed up empowerment computation 
already exists and that such approximations may well be viable. 
We have, therefore, grounds to believe that future work will find 
even better ways to scale empowerment computation up, thus 
rendering it more suitable to deployment on practically relevant 
robotic systems.
4.2. Model acquisition
Traditional methods for empowerment calculation crucially 
require the agent to have an interventional forward model 
(Salge et al., 2012). So far, we have sidestepped this question of 
model acquisition, mostly because the acquisition of the local 
interventional model to compute empowerment can be treated 
as a separate problem which can be solved in different ways by 
existing methods (Dearden and Demiris, 2005; Nguyen-Tuong 
and Peters, 2011).
First, one would learn the local causal dynamics of 
agent–world interaction; from this one can then compute 
empowerment which, as a second step, provides an intrinsic 
reward or pseudo-utility function which is associated with the 
different world states distinguishable to the agent. As exam-
ple, previous work in the continuous domain demonstrated 
how Gaussian Process learners (Rasmussen and Williams, 
2006) can learn the local dynamics of a system on the fly 
while empowerment based on these incrementally improved, 
experience-based models can then be used to control inverted 
pendulum models (Jung et al., 2011) or even a physical robot 
(Leu et al., 2013).
Whether the forward model is prespecified or learnt during 
the run, empowerment will generally drive the agent toward 
states with more options. However, if trained during the run of 
the agent, the model will in general also include uncertainty on 
the outcome of actions. Such uncertainty “devalues” any options 
available in this state and will lead to a reduction of empower-
ment. This reduction is irrespective of whether the uncertainty 
is due to “objective” noise in the environment and unpredict-
ability (e.g., due to another agent) or due to internal model errors 
stemming from insufficient training. From the point of view of 
empowerment both effects are equivalent.
The first class of uncertainty (environmental uncertainty) will 
tend to drive the agent away from noisy or unpredictable areas to 
comparatively more predictable ones if the available options are 
otherwise equivalent, or reduce the value of richer option sets 
when they can be only unpredictably invoked. The second class of 
uncertainty (model uncertainty) will—in the initial phase of the 
training—cause empowerment to devalue states where the model 
cannot resolve the available options. This has consequences for 
a purely empowerment-driven exploration of rich, but non-
obvious interaction patterns; a prominent candidate for such a 
scenario would be learning the behavior of other agents, as long 
as they are comparatively reliable.
The intertwining of learning and empowerment-driven 
behavior can thus be expected to produce a number of meta-
effects on top of the already discussed dynamics. This could range 
from exhibiting a very specific type of exploratory behavior; 
moreover, such agents might initially be averse to encountering 
complex novel dynamics and other agents. On the other hand, by 
modulating the learning process and experience of an agent as 
well as its sensory resolution or “scope of attention” depending 
on the situation, one could guide the agent toward developing the 
desired sensitivities.
Such a process would, in a way, be reminiscent of the sociali-
zation of animals and humans to ensure that they develop an 
appropriate sense for the social dynamics of the world they live in. 
This, together with the earlier discussion in this paper, invites the 
hypothesis that, to be confident of the safety of an autonomous 
robot the following is essential: not only does this machine need 
to be “other-aware,” but if that “other-awareness” is to be learnt 
while enjoying to a large extent the level of autonomy that an 
intrinsic motivation model provides, it will be essential for the 
machine to undergo a suitably organized socialization process.
As a technical note, we remark that the type of model required 
for empowerment computation only needs to relate the actions 
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and current sensor states to the expected subsequent sensor states 
and does not require the complete world mechanics. In fact, 
empowerment can be based on the general, but purely intrinsic 
Predictive State Representations (PSR) formalism (Singh et  al., 
2004; Anthony et al., 2013). This makes it suitable for application 
to recent robotic approaches (Maye and Engel, 2013) interested 
in the idea of sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan and Noë, 
2001); this work considers the understanding of the world to 
be built up by immediate interaction with it and learning which 
actions change and which do not change the agent’s perception. 
This offers a route to deploy empowerment already on very simple 
robots with the aim of gradually building an “understanding” of 
the world from the bottom up.
4.3. partial sensor empowerment
One central property of empowerment is that the formalism 
remains practically unchanged for different incarnations of 
robots or agents and has very few parameters; the time horizon 
being the only one for discrete empowerment. However, there 
is one, less obvious, “parameter” which has only been briefly 
discussed in the previous literature (Salge et al., 2014c) and only 
hinted at in the last section: the question of sensor and actuator 
selection in the model.
By considering only certain sensor variables, one can reduce 
the state space and speed up computation immensely. However, 
one also influences the outcome of the computation by basically 
assigning which distinctions between states of the world should 
be considered relevant. An agent with positional sensors will only 
care about mobility, while an agent with visual sensors might also 
care about being in a state with different reachable views. In the 
simplest models, we often just assume that the agent perceives 
the whole world. In biological examples, we can lean on the idea 
of evolutionary adaptation (i.e., Jeffery (2005)), arguing that 
sensors that would register states irrelevant to the agent would 
disappear, leaving only relevant sensors. Meanwhile, on a robot, 
we usually have a generous selection of sensors, and we might not 
consider all of them to be relevant. However, for parsimonious 
design, or in imitation of a hypothesized principle of parsimony 
in biology (Laughlin et al., 1998), it might be opportune to limit 
oneself to selecting essentially those sensors associated with 
capabilities worth preserving. Similarly, when considering the 
human empowerment, modeling the appropriate human sensors 
will make a big difference to which operational capacities of 
the human, and which forms of influence on the world, will be 
protected by the robot.
This becomes even more of an issue when considering transfer 
empowerment which is basically an example of using partial sen-
sor selection to focus on relevant properties. If both the human 
and the robot could fully sense the environment, then the human 
empowerment and the human-to-robot transfer empowerment 
would be identical, as both the human and the robot sensors 
would capture exactly the same information. In the continuous 
2D example presented in this paper, we considered the human’s 
sensors to only capture the human’s position, and the robot 
sensors to only capture the robot’s position, so their perceptions 
would be distinct. In the NPC AI example by Guckelsberger 
and Salge (2016), the player and companion have sensors that 
perceive the world around it within a certain distance, and always 
relative to their own position. That is, they detect the content of 
the field directly to the east of the player, rather than specify the 
field of interest by a coordinate value such as 3.1.
If we extended the human’s sensors to the extent that the 
human could sense at least everything that the robot can sense, 
then the sensors relevant for transfer empowerment would be 
a subset of human empowerment. We could then just compute 
human empowerment and capture both potential causal flows 
at the same time. But by splitting the sensor variables, we basi-
cally compute partial sensor empowerment, once for the sensors 
pertaining to the human state and once with a selection of sen-
sors pertaining to the robot state. In a real world scenario the 
embodied perspective of both the human and the robot usually 
lead to different perceptions of the world. Both have limited sen-
sors and as a result there is a natural distinction between their 
respective sensor inputs. When using simulated environment, 
on the other hand, it is often easy to give all agents access to 
the whole world state. In this case it becomes necessary to limit 
the sensors of the different agents to introduce this split, before 
one is able to differentiate between the two different heuristics. 
This separation of human and human-to-robot empowerment 
allows for the prioritization of human empowerment over 
transfer empowerment. In general, we would expect one bit 
of human empowerment to be more valuable than one bit of 
human-to-robot empowerment and, therefore, aim to retain this 
distinction.
4.4. Combination of the Heuristics
Whenever different variants of some evaluation function exist 
which cover different aspects of a phenomenon and these 
aspects are combined, one is left with the question how to weight 
them against each other. In the present case, this would mean 
balancing the three types of empowerment. The analogy with 
the Three Laws might suggest a clear hierarchy, where one would 
first maximize human empowerment and then only consider 
the other heuristics. However, given that one can always expect 
some minimal non-trivial gradient to exist in the first, such a 
lexicographic ordering would basically lead to only maximizing 
human empowerment above all else, completely overriding the 
other measures.
On the other hand, going back to Figure 6, we saw that the 
companion, when faced with a threat to itself and the player, 
choose to first save itself from death, while permitting minor 
damage to the player, and only then proceeded to remove the 
threat to the player. While this clearly violates the strict hierarchy 
of the Three Laws, such a course of action might well be in the 
rational interest of the player, since it might be worthwhile to trade 
the minor loss of a life point for still having a companion (all this, 
of course, presumes that the agent’s forward model is correct that 
the enemy shooting the human once will not seriously damage 
the latter; but such dilemmata are also present in mission-critical 
human decision-making under uncertainty).
This conceptual tension is also present in the original Three 
Laws. Consider a gedankenexperiment where a robot is faced 
with two options: (A) inflicting minor harm, such as a scratch, on 
a single human or (B) by avoiding that, permitting the destruction 
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of all (perfectly peaceful) robots on earth. In a strict interpreta-
tion, the Laws would dictate to chose option (B), but we might 
be inclined to consider that there must be some amount of harm 
so negligible that (A) would seem the better option than cause a 
regression to a robotic “Stone Age.”
But how could we capture this insight with our three previ -
ously developed heuristics? We can, of course, consider a straight-
forward weighted sum of the three heuristics, defining some 
trade-off between the three values in the usual manner. But this 
approach inevitably raises the question whether there would be 
some distinct non-arbitrary trade-off.
The previous analogy is instructive. The problem is that 
option (B), the destruction of all robots, would create a lot of 
more significant problems further down the line than the single 
scratch of option A. It would result in the loss of all robots able 
to carry out the human commands, and there would be fewer 
robots to protect and save humans in the future (they would have 
to be rebuilt, absorbing significant productive work, before—if at 
all—reaching original levels).
Both of these problems are reflected in human empowerment 
on longer timescales. In fact, we would suggest that all three heu-
ristics, and actually also the original Three Laws, reflect the idea 
that one core reason why humans build and program robots is 
actually to increase their very own empowerment, their very own 
options for the future. We already argued that transfer empower-
ment, the second heuristic, extends human empowerment further 
into the world, because the robot amplifies the human’s actions 
and their impact on the world. Similarly, robots that preserve 
themselves, as by following the third heuristic, make sure that 
they preserve or extend the human’s empowerment further.
The first heuristic is already directly about human empower-
ment maximization itself. So, in essence, the two other heuristics, 
robot empowerment and transfer empowerment, can be seen as 
a form of meta-heuristics for ultimate human empowerment 
maximization. We conjecture that both the behaviors of the 
second and the third heuristic might emerge once one maximizes 
the human empowerment with a sufficiently long temporal hori-
zon. For example, the robot could realize, with a good enough 
model of the future, that it needs to keep itself functional in 
order to prevent harm to the human in the future. So, basically, 
we hypothesize that the Second and Third Law might manifest 
themselves as a short term proxy for a suitable longer term 
optimization of human empowerment. If so, it may be that this 
would help define a natural trade-off: in our example, the robot 
might calculate that, by preventing destruction of all robots on 
earth, at cost of inflicting a small scratch on a human, it would 
prevent many more and worse injuries of humans in the future 
by the thus rescued robots.
4.5. Multi-agent empowerment
One final remark: in this paper we have not considered true multi-
agent empowerment. The reason for this is subtle: empowerment 
so far is usually computed as an open-loop channel capacity. The 
future (potential) action sequences considered for empowerment 
are basically executed without reacting to the changing sensor 
states inside the time horizon. In other words, empowerment is 
computed as the channel capacity between fixed-length “open-
loop” action sequences and the future sensor observation. In 
choosing these action sequences, intermediate sensor observa-
tions are not taken into account. Thus the agent does not react to 
particular developments in the environment while probing the 
potential future actions.
This makes it impossible to formally account for instantane-
ously reacting to another agent’s actions during the computation 
of the potential futures, since this model selects actions only 
at the beginning and then only evaluates how the will affect 
the world at the end of the action run. However, we showed 
earlier that transfer empowerment can be massively enhanced 
by reacting to the human’s actions. This indicates strongly that 
it would be important to model empowerment with “reactive” 
action sequences, i.e., empowerment where action sequences are 
expressed in closed-loop form and which instantaneously react 
to other agents (or even changes in the environment) while still 
inside the time horizon of the probed futures.
These various aspects of the implementation of empowerment 
indicate a number of strategies to render it a useful tool to opera-
tionalize the Three Laws in a transparent way. Furthermore, they 
also may offer a pathway demonstrating how also other classes of 
intrinsic motivation measures might be adapted to achieve the 
fusion of the desirable autonomy of robots with the requirements 
of the Three Laws.
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